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Abstract 
 
 
This article provides an analysis of German foreign fighters who have left for Syria and Iraq 
since early 2012 and make up the second largest contingent among Western foreign fighters.i 
It draws on statistical information about German foreign fighters, but also uses case studies in 
an attempt to shed more detailed light on their motivations and why they became radicalized. 
Drawing on recently released government data, trial documents, and media reports, the article 
seeks to contribute to new research on the prevailing mechanisms of Jihadi radicalization. To 
facilitate this kind of comprehensive analysis, McCauley and Moskalenko’s Friction 
framework is applied to fourteen prominent German fighters, including Denis Cuspert (who 
served as medium-level ISIL propaganda official), Philip Bergner and Robert Baum 
(responsible for ISIL suicide attacks in Iraq and Syria), Kreshnik B.ii and Harun Pashtoon 
(among the first returning fighters convicted of ISIL membership and other terrorist 
activities). The article concludes with a discussion of countermeasures used to prevent foreign 
fighters from leaving Germany, deradicalize those who have started to embrace violent ideas 
and/or actions, and deal with returning foreign fighters.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
 
 25 
Violent Radicalization Literature and the Friction Framework 
The literature on violent radicalization offers numerous explanations, approaches, and 
theories, illustrating that there is no common profile or trajectory that we can rely on to 
identify those most likely to embrace jihadi violence.iii When sorting through the growing 
array of literature, a few common denominators become apparent. First, the radicalization 
process may involve an individual or a group setting. When it comes to individual 
radicalization, psychodynamic, cognitive, and identity forming explanations focus on 
personality traits and attitudes and may be connected to early childhood development, 
deficient cognitive skills, or vulnerable teenage identities.iv Radicalization that occurs within a 
group setting has been addressed by social movement and network theories.v Second, violent 
radicalization may be caused by either internal or external factors. The former refer to a 
personal desire and/or search for identity, home, status, adventure, or money. The latter 
includes grievances involving economic, political, or social conditions that are imposed by 
others. The French sociological school, inter alia, has focused on these kinds of structural 
factors, but always in the context of globalization leading to confused identities that clash 
with life in modern Western societies.vi All of these categories may also overlap, that is to say 
that both individuals and group members can be affected by internal or external factors. 
 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s Friction framework captures many of 
these schools of thought and their various strands and is therefore particularly well equipped 
to identify and analyze radicalization processes. While relying on psychological theory and 
contemporary as well as historic case studies, McCauley and Moskalenko also integrate 
various overlapping facets of the existing approaches mentioned above. As part of their 
comprehensive framework, McCauley and Moskalenko distinguish between three 
radicalization settings: Individual, group, or mass. The six mechanisms of individual 
radicalization include personal or group grievances (threats or harm inflicted upon self, loved 
ones, groups, or causes), slippery slope (political engagement that radicalizes individuals to 
participate in larger struggle), love (emotional ties to someone already radicalized), risk and 
social status (radicalization happens to those attracted to adventure and fame) and unfreezing 
(the loss of social connections makes individuals open to new ideas and identities).vii Group 
radicalization may involve polarization (agreement among like-minded people reinforces 
more extreme positions), competition (with other radical groups), or isolation (separation 
  
 
 26 
from others will intensify group dynamics and groupthink).viii Finally, masses can be 
radicalized by means of jujitsu politics (agent provocateurs who bait governments into 
overreacting and thereby mobilize whole population segments), hatred (enemies are perceived 
as less human), or martyrdom (those sacrificing their lives for a cause rally others to join the 
fight) mechanisms.ix Summing up, McCauley and Moskalenko’s comprehensive framework 
serves as a potent instrument for determining radicalization pathways of German foreign 
fighters who have left for Syria and Iraq; it not only incorporates individual and group 
radicalization but also covers internal factors as well as external grievances. 
 The next part applies the Friction framework to 1) German government statistics on 
individuals who left Germany for Iraq and Syria as well as 2) case studies of some of 
Germany’s most prominent foreign fighters. 
 
Germany’s Foreign Fighters: Stats and Cases  
 
Why and how do German foreign fighters become radicalized? According to a German 
intelligence report that was released in December 2015, a total of 677 German nationals have 
left for Syria and Iraq since 2012.x (The report only analyses travel departures up until June 
29, 2015; the current official estimate puts the number of departees at 790). On average, the 
departees featured in the report were 26 years old and first became radicalized at age 22. More 
than three quarters were male.  
 Most were considered German in the sense that they were either born in Germany, or 
spent significant time growing up in Germany (having moved to Germany before age 14). The 
majority was well educated and/or in the process of obtaining a high school diploma, 
university degree, or completing an apprenticeship.   
 What is noticeable is the significant number of petty criminals: One third of the 
departees broke the law before leaving for Syria/Iraq, with the percentage of politically 
motivated crimes rising once the radicalization process commenced. Interestingly, almost 20 
percent were converts to Salafism. Also important for this analysis is the fact that most of 
them radicalized through personal contact with family members, friends, and schoolmates, or 
else by means of personal engagement at Salafi mosques, events, and activities.   
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 Group dynamics certainly mattered for travel movements: Available data on 86 
percent of all departees shows that almost 50 percent left together with friends.xi While 32 
percent also traveled with family members, 30 percent traveled alone.  Most importantly, the 
report offers clues regarding the motivations of those who left; often there were multiple 
reasons at play. Based on available data (on 79 percent of the departees), most wanted to join 
the Jihad (70 percent), and, to a lesser degree, wanted to live in the caliphate (24 percent) or 
provide humanitarian assistance (23 percent). Revolutionary objectives (9 percent) and 
marriage plans (6 percent) ranked last.xii Interestingly, the declaration of the caliphate in June 
2014 appears to have had an effect on the motivations of all those who left for Syria and Iraq 
after the proclamation, as there was a significant raise in numbers of those wanting to 
emigrate so they could live the Jihadi utopia in the Islamic State as well as an increase in 
women seeking marriage between June 2014 and 2015. By contrast, humanitarian objectives 
declined.xiii  
  In terms of evident Friction mechanisms, group polarization appears to have played a 
role in the sense that most Germans left in groups of friends and relatives, suggesting that they 
also became radicalized together. In addition, group grievances could have mattered for all 
those who were motivated by humanitarian reasons. Finally, love may have been a driving 
factor for women seeking marriage in the caliphate.  
 But the role of statistical reports is limited. Statistics can offer a broad overview and 
help illustrate certain trends but lack the details needed for analyzing radicalization processes, 
warranting a more detailed case study analysis of prominent German foreign fighters. The 
cases were selected based on the availability of public data which was often determined by 
one or more of the following factors: German foreign fighters 1) held positions within ISIL; 
2) died in combat or committed suicide attacks while in Syria or Iraq; 3) were among those 
prosecuted and/or convicted upon their return to Germany. Of the fourteen fighters thus 
surveyed, eight died fighting in Syria or Iraq (among them five suicide bombers), and six 
were arrested and/or convicted upon their return to Germany.  
 
Denis Cuspert: Cuspert was arguably Germany’s most prominent foreign fighter in Syria, 
serving as ISIL operative responsible for German language propaganda. Born in Berlin, Denis 
did not know his father, who was from Ghana and returned to his home country when Denis 
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was still a baby. His relationship with his stepfather, an American soldier, was severely 
strained so that Denis did not spend much time home growing up. He joined the gang life at 
an early age and frequently got arrested for violent crimes. While serving a prison sentence in 
his late twenties Denis became interested in rapping.  Deso Dogg (Deso stands for for Devil’s 
Son) developed a regional reputation, but his career as a hip hop artist never took off. 
However, friends noted that frequent prison terms seemed to make him more religious.xiv By 
2007, Denis was considered a devout Muslim.xv A car accident in 2008 represented a defining 
moment after which he fully embraced Salafism. He started serving as guest speaker at Islam 
seminars by 2010 and now sang religious fight songs, so-called nasheeds, instead of rap 
songs.xvi In 2011, Denis co-founded Millatu Ibrahim, an extremist Salafist network; the group 
was banned a year later for staging violent Salafi demonstrations in Bonn and Solingen.xvii 
Denis left for Egypt and Syria soon after. Now calling himself Abu Talha al-Almani, Denis 
frequently posted videos from Syria, encouraging his brothers, “to join the jihad” because 
“This is freedom! Life is great here. It’s fun. Jihad is fun!”xviii According to those who knew 
him, he was seeking respect, fame, and admiration.xix He “was always searching for 
something,” but most importantly, wanted to “desperately belong,” be that to an American 
street gang, the Kurdish nation, Alevi tradition, or rap culture. He finally found belonging in 
the Jihadist ummah.xx According to U.S. government and media reports, Denis Cuspert was 
killed by U.S. airstrikes in October 2015.  
 
Burak Karan: The son of Turkish parents, Burak was born and raised in Wuppertal. He was 
recruited into the German national youth soccer team, where he played together with Kevin 
Prince Boateng and Sami Khedira who moved on to international soccer fame.xxi According to 
his coach, Burak was a “calm, disciplined and reliable player, who really wanted to become a 
soccer professional.”xxii He also observed his religious duties when playing for the national 
team, praying regularly and taking part in fasting during Ramadan.xxiii Other players note that 
Burak was a fun-loving guy. However, an injury forced Burak to give up soccer as well as any 
dreams of a professional soccer career at age 20. He played his last soccer game in 2008, and 
quickly became radicalized afterwards, spending many hours at a mosque in Wuppertal. 
Among those attending the mosque was a small group which attended a terrorist training 
camp along the Afghan-Pakistani border in spring 2010. While Burak left together with his 
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mosque friends, there is conflicting information about whether he actually went to 
Waziristan.xxiv According to his sister, Burak could not stop talking about jihad once he 
returned from the training camp. He was also suspected of having ties to Cuspert’s Millatu 
Ibrahim group. His brother Mustafa painted a slightly different picture of Burak, noting that 
“money and (having a) career were not important things to him. Instead he constantly 
searched the internet for videos of war zones. He was desperate, and full of compassion for 
the victims,”xxv identified with their suffering and their political predicament. Burak left for 
Syria together with his wife and children and died in combat fighting for Al-Qaeda in 2013.  
 
Kreshnik B.: Born in Bad Homburg to Kosovar parents Kreshnik used to play soccer at the 
Jewish TuS Makkabi sports club in Frankfurt. He completed his Realschule diploma (the mid-
level secondary school track) and began pursuing his Gymnasium high school diploma (the 
highest of three possible secondary school tracks in Germany) in structural engineering at a 
vocational school in Frankfurt, in order to attend university at a later point. At the new school, 
Kreshnik started becoming interested in Islam through his new friends who had long 
conversations about the conflict in Syria.xxvi According to former classmates, the Middle East 
conflict was a hot topic between classes, and students were handing out Qurans. Kreshnik 
became invested in the Syrian conflict, and, as he explained during his trial, wanted to help 
his “Muslim brothers” fight the oppression and tyranny of the Assad regime.xxvii In summer 
2013, Kreshnik stopped coming to school and left for Syria. Together with six of his friends, 
at least three of them classmates, he took the bus to Turkey and then crossed the border to 
Syria. While in Syria, Kreshnik kept in touch with his sister. Apart from the action and fun 
factor, he told her he was determined to fight for the caliphate and sharia, and also hoped to 
fall as a martyr. “I'm chillin’, fighting, doing my job for Allah. I take my Kalashnikov and 
bismillah.”xxviii He also told his sister about combat and his weapons training. In fact, 
Kreshnik was hoping to make a difference as a sharpshooter, a career arguably more easily 
obtainable than studying for the high school or college diploma back home in Germany. 
However, since he was from Europe he was not asked to join the front lines, but mostly put on 
guard duty. Kreshnik explained to a German court that he did not care which group he would 
fight for. He ended up joining ISIL, one of only few terrorist groups willing to take unskilled 
Western men without combat experience, linguistic, or cultural knowledge as Westerners can 
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still serve as cannon fodder or suicide bombers.xxix However, Kreshnik was unwilling to serve 
as the latter. After five months in Syria, he returned to Germany, disappointed and 
disillusioned, and was arrested upon his arrival. Kreshnik became the first German to be 
convicted of membership in ISIL and was sentenced to three years and nine months in prison. 
 
Philip Bergner: Philip was born and raised in Dinslaken, a blue collar town in North Rhine 
Westphalia, and converted to Islam in 2009. Growing up, he played soccer for SuS 09 
Dinslaken, enjoyed breakdance, but did not obtain his Hauptschule diploma, a common 
secondary school degree (but lowest of three possible tracks) because the school expelled him 
due to drug dealings. Philip became a drifter, living off welfare and occasional jobs. He 
committed petty crimes with his gang, and dreamed of becoming a gangster-rapper. By age 16 
he was fully addicted to drugs; he was subsequently diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia 
and lived in a half-way house for the mentally ill until he was 19 years old.xxx During this 
time, he committed various crimes, including larceny, robberies, and battery. His life gained 
structure and purpose, however, once he made the personal acquaintance of a Salafist 
preacher, Mustafa Topal, and converted to Islam. He grew a beard, started wearing traditional 
garb, stopped drinking alcohol and smoking, demanded that his female relatives cover up, and 
tried converting his mother to Islam. Still living off of welfare, according to his mother he 
“despised any artisan or technical jobs,” he delivered pizzas and worked in a call center.xxxi 
Philip became the leader of the so-called Lohberg group (named after their neighborhood in 
Dinslaken), a circle of about 25 school friends and Salafists who between 2011 and 2013 
regularly met for discussion, lectures, and prayer at Topal’s Dinslaken Institute for Education 
(which, ironically, was located right next to the office of the local Dinslaken commissioner 
for integration). He got married to a Muslim woman, but the marriage broke apart very soon 
because Philip’s wife did not follow sharia to his liking. Afterwards, Philip moved in with his 
aunt for some six months and developed a close friendship with his cousin, Nils Donath. 
Philip departed for Syria in 2013, together with his Lohberg brigade friends.xxxii Now calling 
himself Abu Osama, Philip was the first German to be featured in an ISIL video in November 
2013. In one of his clips he gloated that “we have everything here: food, beverages. 
Everything. More and better than in Germany;”xxxiii and men could even marry up to four 
wives. When Philip suffered a severe injury in early 2014, preventing him from serving in 
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combat, he signed up for a suicide mission. In summer 2014, he drove a truck bomb into a 
Kurdish base near Mosul.xxxiv  
 
Nils Donath: Nils was also from Dinslaken. He decided to follow his cousin, Philip Bergner, 
to Syria in October 2013, where he stayed for a total of 13 months.xxxv He was close to his 
two-year older cousin and thought of him as a brother. Nils was lazy and below average in 
school, completing the lowest secondary school track of Hauptschule. According to his trial 
documents, things went south during his teenage years: When Nils was 15, his parents 
separated, his father moved in with the best friend of his mother, and Nils fathered a daughter 
with his 16-year-old girlfriend. By now he regularly drank alcohol and consumed drugs, and 
also dealt with marihuana. He quit his apprenticeship, never held a real job, and became an 
aimless drifter, not interested in anything, just “partying.” Once his cousin Philip converted to 
Salafi Islam, Nils also became intrigued by the religion, started reading the Quran and 
watching online videos. Like his cousin, he changed his lifestyle, converted to Islam in 
August 2011, found new meaning in life, and joined the radical Salafist circles in Lohberg. 
The Lohberg group met regularly, for lectures, discussions, video sessions, and, over time, its 
members were increasingly considering joining Jihad.xxxvi Nils, however, still had to serve an 
eight month prison sentence for burglary. Upon his release and following cousin Philip’s 
encouragement, he followed his Lohberg friends to Syria.xxxvii Once in Syria, Nils not only 
joined the Islamic State but he also served in ISIL’s secret police, a position rarely attained by 
Western foreigners, participating in arrests and possibly torture and executions. Nils went 
back to Germany after Philip’s death where he was arrested on terrorist group membership 
charges in January 2015.xxxviii  
 
David Gaeble: David was born and grew up in Kempten, a small but wealthy town in 
southern Bavaria. He completed his Realschule degree but was not a good student, which may 
explain why he did not find an apprenticeship right away. His friends note that he seemed lost 
at this point in life.xxxix David finally opted for a practicum with an electrical engineering 
company, which ended up offered him an apprenticeship. Around the same time, he converted 
to Islam, at age 16, and his outlook on life started changing; he told his family he had now 
found the meaning of life.xl David started spending time with local Muslim families and his 
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new Muslim friends in Kempten. An avid boxer, he began viewing the sport incompatible 
with Islam; he continued for a little while longer, but finally quit in August 2013. A few 
weeks earlier, in July 2013, David also quit his apprenticeship. He changed his name to 
Abdullah Dawud al Almani, and, according to his family, explained that he “did not belong 
here, because everybody is different.”xli By now, David slept on the floor, read vast quantities 
of Salafist literature, poured over the lectures of Salafist hate preachers, and studied Arabic 
whenever possible. He also started an internet platform for radical Salafist videos and often 
traveled to Dinslaken, where he spent time together with Philip Bergner and other Salafists, 
especially after he was no longer welcome in the moderate mosque of Kempten. In Dinslaken, 
he became close to Mustafa Topal, a drug dealer-turned-Salafi preacher and recruiter, who 
encouraged plans to go to Syria. However, David and a friend from Kempten were stopped at 
Munich airport on route to Turkey - David’s name was on a no-travel list after his parents had 
contacted police in an effort to prevent him from going to Syria. Determined to make his way 
to Syria, David opted to take the train instead, two weeks later, together with his best friend 
Mustafa. In an email to his family David later commented on the delicious banana cocktails 
he enjoyed for very little money as well as his possible move into a luxury mansion.xlii He was 
19 when he died fighting in Syria in 2014.xliii 
 
Robert Baum: Robert left for Egypt and Syria in fall 2012, together with his best friend, 
Christian Emde. He was from the small town of Solingen, where his father died of cancer 
shortly before Robert’s thirteenth birthday. Robert went on to complete Hauptschule and 
joined the German military when he was 17, but was discharged for disseminating right-wing 
extremist propaganda. He had wanted to join the German troops in Afghanistan and take part 
in the combat mission, however, he ended up doing administrative work and got bored, 
spreading Nazi propaganda on the internet and in his barracks room. He went back to school 
and completed his mid-level secondary school degree (Realschule diploma). Afterwards, 
Robert started an apprenticeship in logistics, but his company did not keep him on once he 
completed his training because he was considered unreliable and difficult. By now, Robert 
had converted to Islam; reportedly he first became interested in the religion through an 
information flier.xliv Robert changed his name to Abdul Hakim, repeatedly went to Egypt to 
learn Arabic, and spent all his time at a small mosque in downtown Solingen which was 
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regularly frequented by some of Germany’s most prominent Salafist preachers (for example, 
Abou Nagie and Pierre Vogel), as well as Christian Emde. He also changed his physical 
appearance, wearing traditional garb, avoiding alcohol and pork. Due to these changes, and 
because he demanded his mother cover up and wear a veil, he moved out from home and into 
an apartment. When Robert and his new friend and fellow convert, Christian, traveled to the 
UK in July 2011, British customs officials discovered files on how “build a bomb in your 
Mom’s kitchen” and “39 Ways to Support Jihad” on their hard drives. They were arrested, 
prosecuted, and spent six months at Belmarsh prison, even sharing a cell at times. While in 
Belmarsh, they regularly participated and engaged in Islam courses, Quran studies, and Friday 
prayer sessions, and also bonded with British Jihadi inmates.xlv Back in Germany, they visited 
known Salafist hate preachers and also joined Cuspert’s Millatu Ibrahim. Uthman al-Almani, 
as he became known in Syria, died as the first German Muslim convert suicide bomber on the 
Syrian battlefield in early 2014, at age 26.xlvi Christian Emde continues to serve ISIL in 
Mosul. 
 
Harun Pashtoon: Harun’s parents were from Afghanistan, but he was born and raised in the 
wealthy city of Munich. Based on his testimony, Harun had a bad relationship with his father, 
who was very religious and often beat him. Harun also engaged in self-mutilation, “to relieve 
pressure,” cutting his arms so they required stitches.xlvii Until his late teens he led an otherwise 
normal social life, drinking alcohol, going to bars and dance clubs. He managed to obtain the 
Hauptschule diploma, but did not complete any of the three apprenticeships he started after 
school. He was fired from two of them due to tardiness and quit one of them because he found 
it to be too much work.xlviii When Harun and his Turkish girlfriend lost their baby daughter 
shortly after it was born in 2008, Harun started having serious anger issues and spent time in 
prison on battery charges. According to court documents, Harun became very religious in 
2012 and radicalized by spring 2013: He openly called for violent jihad and threatened to 
decapitate the non-believers. Six months later he left for Syria, at age 25. Like most Western 
fighters, Harun received weapons and martial arts training, in addition to a few Arabic 
lessons.xlix However, he soon grew bored with camp routines and could not wait to join 
combat, because “there is real action.” Life in Syria did turn out as expected, however, and 
Harun spent his time mostly “bored to death;”l he eventually decided to return to Germany. 
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There he was arrested upon his arrival and subsequently convicted on murder charges, with a 
prison sentence of eleven years.   
 
Rachid Benamar: The German-Moroccan held dual citizenship, but was born and lived in 
Frankfurt. He was raised Muslim, attending mosque regularly and fasting during Ramadan. 
Rachid also went to parties, drank alcohol, and led a Western lifestyle. He loved playing 
soccer, but had to give up any serious soccer ambitions when he suffered a severe injury in 
early 2008, forcing him to take a break of 18 months.li After obtaining his Abitur (the highest 
of all secondary school diplomas) Rachid went to university in Wiesbaden, majoring in 
environmental engineering with a focus on renewable energies. At the university he mostly 
hung out with Turks and Arabs, however, his older brother, Hafid Benamar, a committed 
Salafist, appeared to have played the most instrumental role in Rachid’s radicalization.lii 
Beginning in 2011, Rachid grew a beard, changed his behavior toward women and his soccer 
teammates, and started wearing traditional garb. He moved in with his older brother and 
Salafist sister-in-law at the end of 2012, and their relationship was considered close. Through 
his brother, Rachid met prominent Salafi preachers and took part in their events and seminars; 
he also started frequenting Salafist mosques. Both brothers left for Egypt in 2013.liii From 
Egypt they traveled to Syria via Turkey in 2014 and joined ISIL. Rachid was featured in an 
ISIL propaganda video on “al-Furqan,” where he talked (in broken Arabic mixed with 
German) about his dream of dying as a martyr. He obtained an opportunity to do just that 
when the sickly Rachid, who already suffered from various illnesses due to the rough climate 
along the Syrian-Iraqi border, also injured his foot.liv The 27-year old died driving a truck 
bomb into a building on an Iraqi army base in Ramadi in August 2014. 
 
Ahmet Cetinkaya: The 21-year old detonated a suicide bomb at a checkpoint in the Iraqi 
capital of Bagdad in July 2014, killing 54 people. Born in Witten to Turkish parents, he grew 
up in the small town of Ennepetal located in North Rhine Westphalia where his father ran a 
falafel restaurant. Ahmet obtained German citizenship when he was 20 years old and was a 
dual citizen of Turkey and Germany. While he was raised Muslim by his parents, he did not 
speak Arabic.lv When his parents separated, Ahmet lived with his mother and took care of his 
little sister. Ahmet played soccer, led a Western life going to the boxing gym and dance clubs, 
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drinking alcohol, and dating women. According to his former soccer team mates, he cared a 
lot about the club camaraderie and his own standing within the group.lvi He also spent much 
time with his close friend Tahir Guendogan, whom he met in elementary school. However, he 
was never able to succeed much in secondary school and, after dropping out of Realschule, 
only obtained a Hauptschule diploma. He went back to Gymmasium in pursuit of his Abitur, 
but was expelled from school after hitting a teacher. Ahmet switched to a trade school but had 
to leave it due to poor grades. He enrolled in a vocational preparatory course at a community 
college, but dropped out after only six months. During this time, he repeatedly engaged in 
violent behavior and received two sentences for assault and battery. He also started taking an 
interest in online Jihadi propaganda and became radicalized within months. Noticeable 
changes in 2014 included growing a beard, participating in extremist Salafist events, attending 
radical mosques, wearing traditional garb, abstaining from alcohol and partying, issuing 
religious and political statements on facebook, and refusing to work at his father’s falafel shop 
which he did not deem halal.lvii His social network changed, too, as he sought out known 
Salafist leaders and contacts, such as the father of his long-time friend Tahir Guendogan. In 
June 2014 he left Germany together with a friend and made his way to Syria. Only six weeks 
later he carried out a suicide attack.  
 
Sofian Khebbache: Born to a German mother who converted to Islam when she got married to 
his Algerian father. Sofian was raised religious to learn the culture, language, and faith of his 
father, but “prayed more than people his age,” and “took that very seriously.”lviii Sofian was 
born in Wolfsburg where his parents were employed at the Volkswagen headquarters. His 
parents separated when Sofian was 19. Growing up, he committed petty crimes (larceny and 
burglaries) together with his two childhood friends, the Taieb brothers, because he was 
“bored,” spending one month in a youth penitentiary. Sofian went to elementary school with 
Mohamed Taieb and would remain close to the brothers throughout his teens, also living with 
them at times. After his prison experience he turned his life around, mostly in response to his 
father’s disappointment. In Braunschweig he completed an apprenticeship as a salesman and 
continued working in this capacity. When he was offered a permanent position, however, he 
did not take it, much to the consternation of his mother. He last worked as a trainer at a high 
rope course. Sofian also had two-long term relationships with girls. According to an internal 
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government report, his radicalization was greatly influenced by the Taieb brothers, both of 
whom are known radical Salafists, and started as early as 2005 when he attended an Islam 
seminar with a known Salafist preacher, and was considered radicalized by 2008. He finally 
was recruited for Jihad in Syria by Yassin Oussaifi at the Wolfsburg Ditib-mosque in 2014, 
where he also found a new social network. However, in contrast to others he never changed 
his appearance.lix He left for Syria in late May 2014, together with Ebrahim B. and Ayoub B. 
While in Syria, he initiated facebook and whatsapp contact with his sister and mother. 
Because his sister was too critical of his endeavors he stopped communicating with her, but 
maintained regular contact with this mother, sending her pictures of Kinder-chocolates and 
Pepsi soda available to ISIL fighters.lx Sofian died in a suicide attack in Iraq, on a bridge in 
Ramadi, the first week of August 2014.      
 
Ebrahim B.: He was born in Wolfsburg, Lower Saxony, to Tunisian parents, but his mother 
soon decided to return to her northern African home, together with Ebrahim and his siblings. 
Ebrahim returned to Germany is his teens, completed his Hautpschule diploma in Wolfsburg, 
followed by an apprenticeship in massage-therapy. He had “practically nothing to do with 
religion,” rarely attended mosque, but led the typical teenage life - smoking, drinking alcohol, 
going to parties, and dating girls.lxi He also became a member of the Social Democratic party. 
When his relationship with his girlfriend was on rocky terms because her parents did not 
approve of Ebrahim, he made the acquaintance of a Salafi preacher. Inter alia, this preacher 
promised that joining ISIL in Syria would allow him to get married to four women and drive 
expensive cars. Ebrahim started growing a beard and enjoyed belonging to a group of fellow-
minded men; he left together with two of them, Ayoub B. and Sofian Khebbache, in May 
2014, when he took a flight from Hanover to Turkey, and then crossed the border to Syria. 
Once he joined ISIL, he decided to sign up for their suicide bomber cadre, but eventually 
changed his mind. After three months in Syria, Ebrahim returned to Germany where he was 
arrested in November 2014. He was convicted of membership in a terrorist group and 
currently serves a three-year prison sentence.      
 
Ayoub B.: Together with Ebrahim B. and Sofian Kehbbache, Ayoub left for Syria in late May 
2014. He was also born in Wolfsburg and, like Ebrahim, of Tunisian heritage; Ayoub’s father 
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served as vice chairman of the German-Tunisian integration association. He was not religious 
growing up, played soccer, but did not do well in school, barely finishing his Realschule 
diploma. He did not start an apprenticeship after school and struggled to find a job, took 
drugs, gambled, and had a falling out with his parents. While receiving treatment for his drug 
and alcohol addiction, Ayoub made the acquaintance of a Salafi preacher. He quickly became 
more interested in radical Islam once he met Yassin Oussaifi and became his confidant, 
gaining respect and status.lxii His parents, concerned about his changes, contacted the police. 
Ayoub B. worked at the Volkswagen factory at the time and reportedly had his first contact 
with Islamic extremists at work. While he had planned on taking vacation in August to go to 
Tunisia and get married, Ayoub changed his mind in April 2014 and submitted his vacation 
slip early, leaving for Syria instead.lxiii He stayed there until August when he escaped from his 
military training camp in northern Syria and returned to Germany. Ayoub was arrested in 
January 2015, subsequently tried, and received a four-year sentence for joining a terrorist 
group. 
 
Harry S.: Harry did not experience the proverbial happy childhood. His Christian parents 
emigrated from Ghana to Germany, but separated once they settled in a blue-collar 
neighborhood of Bremen, a large city in Northern Germany. His American stepfather was 
arrested by German police when Harry was four years old. The biological father rejoined the 
family but regularly beat the children. Harry’s mom worked late hours. His older stepbrother 
was shot to death when Harry was a teenager. Despite all of this, Harry still managed to 
qualify for Gymnasium (the highest school track), where he received good grades. Harry did 
not care much for school, however, since he wanted to become a professional soccer player; 
he played pick-up games with neighborhood friends every day but eventually started falling in 
with the wrong crowd. He committed his first crime at age 12 and was quickly involved in 
burglaries, car thefts, and drug trafficking. Desperate for him to change, his mother enrolled 
him at a prestigious private school in Bremen. Harry soon dropped out of school, looking for 
easy money and eager to lead the gangster life together with his criminal friends. In an effort 
to save him from more prison time, his mother decided to move to London. Once in London, 
Harry made an attempt to turn his life around and enrolled in college. The family had less 
money than in Germany though, and struggled to make ends meet. While homesick for his 
  
 
 38 
Bremen gang, Harry stayed for his mom. She also convinced him to switch to a technical 
college, where he met his first Muslim friends. Fascinated with the religion he converted to 
Islam soon after, a decision that led to serious conflict with his mother, a devout Christian. 
Harry ended up living with his British Salafist friends, studying the Quran and learning 
Arabic. He eventually decided to reconnect with friends in Bremen and returned to Germany. 
Once in Bremen, he returned to his criminal ways, but also became more radicalized. As a 
regular at the Groepeling Masjidu-Furqan mosque he became close friends with fellow 
Salafist convert, Adnan S. At the end of 2013, Harry served another prison sentence for 
robbery. According to German security services, he likely developed and hardened his 
Jihadist convictions while talking to a fellow inmate known for spreading al-Qaeda 
propaganda and foreign fighter recruitment. After his release from prison, Harry left for Syria 
in April 2014, together with Adnan.lxiv In Syria, he underwent weapons training, participated 
in combat, but also participated in the filming of an ISIL propaganda movie designed to 
recruit German foreign fighters and encourage terrorist attacks in Germany.lxv In July 2015 
Harry returned to Germany and was arrested at Bremen airport. He is accused of membership 
in a terrorist organization and murder and currently awaiting trial. 
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What Friction mechanisms are at play? 
Five mechanisms can be identified, some more prevalent than others:   
 
 Group 
Grievances  
 
Slippery 
Slope 
Risk & 
Status 
Unfreezing Group 
Polarization 
Denis 
Cuspert** 
  X X  
Burak 
Karan** 
X X    
Kreshnik B. X  X X X 
Philip 
Bergner* 
   X X 
Nils Donath    X X 
David 
Gaeble** 
    X 
Robert 
Baum* 
   X X 
Harun 
Pashtoon 
  X X  
Rachid 
Benamar* 
   X X 
Ahmet 
Cetinkaya* 
  X X X 
Sofian 
Khebbache* 
  X  X 
Ebrahim B.   X  X 
Ayoub B.   X X X 
Harry S.    X X 
* died in suicide attack **died in combat 
 
  
 
 40 
Group Grievances & Slippery Slope: When individuals start caring about a group or cause 
that appears to be threatened by others, their group grievances may push them toward 
violence.lxvi Burak Karan appears to fall in this category; according to his brother, Burak 
“searched the internet constantly for videos of war zones. He was desperate, full of 
compassion for the victims.” He may have started embracing violent jihad at an Al-Qaeda 
training camp in Pakistan, but eventually found his cause in response to political events in the 
Middle East. When the Syrian civil war started in 2011 Burak became consumed with the 
conflict and began identifying with Syrian victims. He may also be considered an example of 
the slippery slope phenomenon, feeling so strongly for a political cause that he eventually 
radicalized over it. In any case, Burak gradually became more committed to the cause. He 
eventually left for the Turkish-Syrian border, supposedly to deliver food, drugs, and other 
donations to Syrians. According to others he left to join Al Qaeda until he was killed in a 
bomb attack, with his Al-Qaeda commanders praising him because “he fought like a lion.” 
However, in this context it is also worth noting that Burak’s brother, Mustafa, did not believe 
in the militant portraits of his brother and went to Syria in search of Burak’s supposed 
involvement in humanitarian projects. Kreshnik B. also started caring about the conflict in 
Syria and Syrians being threatened by the Assad regime, which was a constant topic among 
Kreshnik and his classmates at school.  
 
Risk & Status: At least four of the German fighters must be considered thrill seekers and risk 
takers: Denis Cuspert, Harun Pashtoon, Kreshnik B., and Sofian Khebbache were looking for 
adventure and fun when arriving in Syria. At the same time, they also sought increased status, 
prestige, and social standing. None of them did well in school; none of them were interested 
in taking traditional educational routes in Germany and instead wanted to make a name for 
themselves as fighters and sharpshooters in Syria. Sofian Khebbache, already engaged in 
petty crimes throughout his teenage life because he was bored and looking for excitement 
(already working as a high rope trainer before his departure), was also drawn to action in 
Syria. Ahmet Cetinkaya did try various conventional educational routes. However, he did not 
have enough discipline and smarts to go beyond a Hauptschule diploma and became 
interested in obtaining status through other means. Ebrahim B. also falls into the status 
category; the learned massage therapist was rejected by his girlfriend’s parents and 
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subsequently lured by tales of fancy cars and polygamy. By a similar token, Ayoub B. gained 
status and respect from others through his close relationship with Yassin Oussaifi, who 
convinced him to go to Syria. In addition, Denis, Harun, Ahmet, and Sofian had violent pasts 
and/or spent time in prison. McCauley and Moskalenko illustrate how men are naturally 
inclined to seek status and risk-taking; young males with troubled backgrounds like Denis and 
Harun turn to violence in order to gain status among peers.  As they had neither money nor 
good jobs to impress women, who are naturally looking for providers and protectors, their 
ranking among male peers is an important indicator of their success. Violence, risk-taking, 
and militant Jihad thus serve as opportunities to climb the social ladder and find a place in 
society.       
 
Unfreezing: When individuals experience a crisis in life that leads to loss or unfreezing of 
social attachments and everyday commitments (because of the loss of a loved one or 
relocation to a new, foreign environment) they become open to new relationships (man is a 
social animal and wants to belong and therefore forms ties with new friends), and thereby new 
ideas and identities. Several of the fighters experienced such shocks in their personal lives: 
Robert Baum and Harun Pashtoon lost their father and daughter, respectively. While Robert 
did not embrace violent Jihad immediately, the loss of a father figure in his life contributed to 
a sense of confusion and extremist behavior in support of Nazi propaganda. A dishonorable 
discharge from the army was a second disconnect he suffered. The loss of his job represented 
the final straw which he coped with by converting to violent Salafism. Harun appears to have 
suffered a serious trauma through the death of his daughter; trial documents include a picture 
of his daughter’s name Ilara “written” in brass bullet casings.lxvii According to a recording of 
his last will, he determined that his money should be used to take care of his daughter’s grave 
site at a Munich cemetery.lxviii Ahmet Cetinkaya’s recurrent educational failures pushed him 
to the breaking point, both physically and emotionally; he became violent and available for 
violent Salafist ideology. Burak Karan’s life was dominated by soccer until he forced to quit, 
likely due to an injury he suffered, leaving a massive hole he sought to fill with radical Islam. 
Similarly, Rachid Benamar suffered a traumatic soccer injury which took 18 months to heal. 
Trying to fit in with new circle of classmates, Kreshnik B. fell in with a new radical crowd 
after switching to his vocational school. Harry became unfrozen when his mother decided to 
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move the family to London; his (criminal) social ties were cut off and he felt lonely in London 
- until he met new Muslim friends and converted to Islam. Once he returned to Germany, he 
sought out the Salafist community and gradually became radicalized. Ayoub B. was at his 
most vulnerable while receiving treatment for drug addiction when he met his radical Salafist 
preacher and new mentor, Yassin Oussaifi at the Wolfsburg Ditib-mosque. Philip Bergner 
also was at the lowest point of his life while being treated for drug addiction and 
schizophrenia, and therefore easy prey for the Jihadist network around Mustafa Topal, 
promising new structures and ideas. While there is overlap with the group polarization 
mechanism (see below), prison experiences arguably represent a drastic break with everyday 
routines and social networks. Denis Cuspert and Nils Donath spent time in prison, where, at 
the very least, they became more religious and converted to Islam. Baum and Emde were able 
to harden their radical views while sharing a cell and talking and praying with their Jihadi 
inmates in Britain. Similarly, Harry S. also appears to have been influenced by fellow inmate 
and Al-Qaeda propagandist.    
 Most of the foreign fighters were first-generation immigrants, including Burak 
(Turkish), Harun (Afghan), Kreshnik (Kosovar), Rachid (Morrocan) and Harry (Ghanese). 
According to Friction, they may have experienced a feeling of disconnection due to 
discrimination based on their foreign origin - first and second generation immigrants are 
between a rock and a hard place because they do not belong to their parent’s country but are 
also not fully accepted in the country they were born in. “So they drop out, join gangs, get 
involved in petty crime and drugs and then sometimes turn to radical Islam as the explanation 
of their plight.”lxix The latter argument does not seem to gain much traction in the case of 
Burak, Kreshnik, or Rachid, as Burak played in the German national youth soccer team and 
Kreshnik pursued a high school diploma and university degree. Rachid not only completed 
the highest high school track of Gymnasium but went on to study at the university. It is also 
difficult to make in Harun’s case, as he completed the quite common Hauptschule diploma 
and was offered three different apprenticeships. However, it could be argued that the death of 
his daughter brought a sense of frustration and disconnect because Harun did not know how to 
bury the daughter according to Islamic rituals.lxx The alienation-discrimination connection 
does seem to have mattered in the case of Harry S., though, who complained about racism 
throughout his school career and eventually dropped out of both public and private schools to 
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pursue a criminal career. While other factors were at play as well, feelings of alienation based 
on discrimination appear to have played a role in Denis Cuspert’s case, too, who addressed 
racism in his rap songs. In any case, he seemed desperate to belong and become part of a 
group, activity, or cause. David Gaeble was also looking to belong; he found the meaning of 
life once he joined the global ummah.     
 When the German foreign fighters actually decided to leave for Syria, they did not 
travel alone, but rather in the company of their new social “support groups:” Philip Bergner 
led his Lohberg group and was soon followed by his cousin Nils Donath, who could not join 
the original wave because he was still in prison; the Wolfsburg group included Ebrahim B., 
Ayoub B., and Sofian Khebbache. Likewise, Kreshnik B. left amidst his new group of friends; 
Robert Baum together with his best friend, Christian Emde; Harry S. with his close friend, 
Adnan S.; Burak Karan with his spouse and children; Rachid Benamar with his brother; 
Ahmed Cetinkaya with a friend; and David Gaeble with his best friend Mustafa Topal.  
 
Group Polarization: Philip Bergner’s Lohberg group meetings represent an excellent example 
of group polarization. The latter occurs when discussions among likeminded people (e.g. 
Salafists) influence individual group members to take on a more radical, extremist view, 
regardless of their initial opinions. Nils Donath and David Gaeble also joined that circle, the 
latter making regular trips from Kempten to Dinslaken. Similarly, Kreshnik B. became 
radicalized through a new circle of friends and long discussions in the school yard. Ebrahim 
B., Ayoub B., and Sofian Khebbache were not only friends but belonged to the Wolfburg 
group around recruiting preacher Yassin Oussaifi. At the same time, family members and ties 
(those to a cousin and brother) played the most significant role in the radicalization of Nils 
Donath and Rachid Benamar. Ahmet Cetinkaya sought Salafist contacts and found an 
important mentor in the father of his best friend whom he had known since elementary school. 
The extremist Salafi Millatu Ibrahim network, before it was banned in 2012, became a similar 
focus of group interactions and discussions for Denis Cuspert, Burak Karan, Robert Baum, 
and Christian Emde. Baum and Emde formed the smallest of groups, but the two friends 
arguably became more polarized when exchanging thoughts and ideas while experiencing 
radicalization, prison time in Great Britain, as well as their departure for Syria together. 
Similarly, Harry S. formed a close association with fellow convert Adnan S. Prisons are a 
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typical setting of group polarization, as inmates participate in so-called prison universities: 
They have unlimited time to discuss and compare best practices and lessons, thoughts and 
ideas, intensify their commitment to a certain cause, as well as network and form new ties. 
Both Denis Cuspert, Nils Donath, Harry S., Robert Baum, and Christian Emde intensified 
their extremist beliefs or converted to violent Salafism while in prison.      
 
Countermeasures & Conclusion 
 
Statistics of German foreign fighters suggest that group dynamics and association 
matter for radicalization processes; few Germans end up traveling to Syria and Iraq alone. The 
motivations for travel are manifold, ranging from wanting to join jihad, engage in combat, 
offer humanitarian assistance, get married, to living in a caliphate. Additional determinations 
can be made when applying the Friction framework to more detailed case studies (even if the 
cases only represent a small fraction of German fighters). Unfreezing and group polarization 
were by far the two most common mechanisms, followed by adventure and status (and 
possible cases of group grievances and/or slippery slope). The majority of German fighters 
analyzed above became radicalized having experienced a shocking event, loss, or disconnect 
in their lives, so much so that they became open to new, radical influences, and group ties. 
Group association played a prominent role as well, as radicalization occurred and intensified 
in personal interactions with fellow “radicals.” Last but not least, joining the battle in Syria 
and Iraq promised action, fun, and prestige for those who had little to lose, been looking for a 
shortcut to success, and were no strangers to violence in the first place.  
 What do these cases tell us about existing countermeasures and programs, designed to 
prevent radicalization in the first place or deradicalize those who have started to embrace 
violent ideas and/or actions? What else could have been done to stop German foreign fighters 
from leaving Germany?  
 German authorities rely on both “soft” assistance and “hard” security measures when 
it comes to preventing and countering violent radicalization and dealing with emerging and 
returning foreign fighters. On the security side, German authorities have opted to confiscate 
passports to make it harder for potential departees to travel or mark their German identity 
cards so they become invalid outside of Germany (travel within the European Union and 
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neighboring states like Egypt and Turkey is possible using the ID card). These administrative 
measures have not been applied consistently though; at least fifteen individuals left for Syria 
in 2013 and 2014 as part of “Wolfsburg wave,” and even though multiple parents contacted 
law enforcement services in a desperate attempt to prevent their children from leaving.lxxi Not 
surprisingly, the German government reported that only few departures, “in the low double 
digits,” could be prevented by early 2014.lxxii However, as David Gaeble’s case illustrates, 
radicalized individuals determined to leave will not be deterred by these measures. David 
ended up traveling to Syria using fake travel documents. Putting individuals suspected of 
wanting to leave for Syria and/or Iraq or commit violent crimes upon their return under 
surveillance serves as another option - however, apart from those looking to travel to Syria, 
the German Federal Criminal Police Office estimates that there are currently 420 potentially 
dangerous Islamists living in Germany and more than 200 fighters have already returned from 
Syria (almost one third of those who have left since the beginning of the Syrian conflict),lxxiii 
putting considerable strains on security services. Surveillance also did not work in David’s 
case, whose family alerted law enforcement and domestic intelligence services to his 
radicalization and possible departure. Even though David’s phone was tapped and his general 
whereabouts monitored, German authorities did not manage to stop him from leaving 
Germany.    
 Returning fighters have been tried and convicted for membership in ISIL or 
committing crimes while in Syria and Iraq. These prosecutions may help deter some from 
going in the first place. The German media has covered these trials and as much of the 
fighters’ backgrounds, radicalization stories, and Syria/Iraq experiences as is available, 
thereby contributing to the building of a counternarrative in selected cases (if only indirectly): 
Some of the fighters arguably returned because they did not find the adventure, status, and 
fulfillment they were looking for; several talked about being disappointed with their foreign 
fighter experience. For the first time, one of the returned fighters, Ibrahim B., was willing to 
share his story of disillusionment in a nationally televised interview as well as various other 
media outlets.lxxiv While a good argument can be made that he may have been interested in a 
reduced prison sentence, Ibrahim’s story also feeds into a powerful counternarrative urgently 
needed to counter Jihadist propaganda and prevent other young people from wanting to join 
the Jihad and the Islamic State caliphate. The reduced sentences that have been applied in 
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various foreign fighter cases also indicate a willingness on behalf of the German government 
to distinguish between die-hard Jihadists and those who have become disillusioned or even 
traumatized due to their experiences in Syria. This, in turn, represents an effort to rehabilitate 
those who “made a mistake,” allow for the reformed and deradicalized ones to re-take a place 
in society, and steer against new prison radicalization, as well as the creation of new martyrs. 
 In terms of “soft” approaches to foreign fighter dilemmas, parents, siblings, relatives, 
and friends are considered invaluable for constructing positive alternatives to violent 
extremism, for building community bonds, and for countering growing ties to the Jihadi 
milieu; usually, they are also the first to notice radicalization symptoms. At least ten of the 
fourteen Germans profiled in this analysis showed noticeable changes in behavior and 
physical appearance. According to the aforementioned German intelligence report on foreign 
fighters, at least half of all German departees surveyed changed their appearance and one third 
their behavior.lxxv Families and friends can seek help by means of the BAMF (Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugee Affairs) counseling network that funds NGOs in four German 
cities and surrounding regions, including Bremen, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Bochum. The Hayat 
Counseling Center in Berlin, run by the ZDK Gesellschaft Demokratische Kultur, is the most 
prominent of the centers due to its long-time experience with exit-assistance programs for 
right-wing extremists. Since January 2012, this public-private partnership thus provides 
nation-wide assistance to families of radicalized individuals. Families in need can call the 
BAMF Counseling Center Radicalization for advice, and the cases are then referred to the 
respective local NGO which engages in professional counseling, mentoring, and targeted 
family-assisted interventions. The various centers provide practical, emotional, and 
ideological assistance for families, help break with old routines, offer counternarratives, and 
also psychological support for those in need.lxxvi In many ways, this family counseling 
network represents the core of German deradicalization efforts. It is in high demand, 
illustrating that, if nothing else, it has been successful in reaching a large target group of 
affected families. Specifically, since 2012, the nationwide BAMF hotline has received more 
than 4,000 calls, resulting in more than 1,500 counseling cases. In fact, it effectively replaced 
a formal exit-program for radicalized individuals, which was run by the domestic intelligence 
service until September 2014 and did not gain much traction. In addition to families, relatives, 
and friends, other potential gatekeepers include teachers, social workers, sports coaches, and 
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apprenticeship trainers, who need to be better educated about radicalization symptoms and 
how to counter them, as many of those who become radicalized are young and lead “normal” 
lives playing soccer, going to school, or completing apprenticeships.lxxvii 
 The BAMF counseling center was not able to provide much help in the case of David 
Gaeble whose family contacted the hotline in early 2014, only to receive an information 
brochure on radicalization.lxxviii In fact, the overall effectiveness of existing programs is far 
from clear and has yet to be assessed or measured. In addition, Germany’s sixteen states offer 
various different programs that range from awareness outreach in public schools, vocational 
training and job placement services, to exit-programs for individuals wanting to leave the 
Jihadist circles.  Likewise, it is not clear how much these initiatives have succeeded in 
preventing violent radicalization and recidivism, or permanently changed violent behavior 
and/or ideologies. Despite the existence of the nationwide family counseling network and 
various other state initiatives, the number of German Syria and Iraq departees continues to 
rise.  
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